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RESTRICTED 
ECONOMIC ELEMENTS OF U. S. WAR POTENTIAL 
A lecture delivered by 
Dr. Bertrand Fox 
at the Naval War College 
October 6, 1949 
My topic this morning is "Economic Elements of the U. S. 
War Potential." As you can·imagine, it is a tremendous topic and 
I am going to have to skim fairly lightly and rapidly over many 
phases of it. I will talk in fairly general terms and hope that vari­
ous specific details can be brought out later in the question period. 
I want to deal with the topic in three major headings and, if there 
is time, to add one additional topic. 
My first of the three headings is "The determinants of maxi­
mum overall production potential." The first point I want to 
make is to dispose of money. In peacetime, the magnitude of what 
is produced in the aggregate, and for any particular segment of the 
ecomomy the maximum of a given thing that can be produced, de­
pends upon money demand. Therefore, we think of money as be­
ing of tremendous importance to the volume of production. In war 
time, however, if the country is solidly behind you, there is no 
problem of appropriations such as you have in peacetime. There 
is no problem that is really difficult relative to raising the money 
to buy what has to be produced. The government will provide the 
demand with money that can come either through taxes, borrow­
ing, or if necessary, various other inflationary means. 
Money itself is not a limiting factor in war production­
that is something that can be disposed of fairly easily. We do use 
money, howeve;, as a general measure, and I will keep referring 
today to a particular magnitude that we call gross national product, 
Doctor Fox is professor of Business Administration at Harvard Uni­
versity. He has been a consultant to the Munitions Board and Na­
tional Security Resources Board since 1947. 
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which is the sum total in value terms of all the goods and services 
produced in this country. That is the measure we use of the total 
level of pl'()duction. It is measured in terms of money because you 
cannot add tanks, ships, and yards of cloth. We have to have a 
common denominator, and for this we use money. But as far as I 
a.m �oncerned and from the point of view of this presentation, we 
can dispose of money. 
The real determinants of production come down to the basic 
and physical factors of production, and I want to deal with each very 
rapidly. First, the human factor-labor. Out of any given popu­
lation, the labor force actually is a small fraction-less than half. 
Out of our population today of approximately one hundred forty to 
one hundred forty-five million people, OU:f labor force. is somewhere 
around sixty to sixty-five million people. Now the magnitude of 
the labor force depends on the composition of the population. Rus­
sia with a much larger population has a smaller labor force. They 
are in a stage of a rapidly growing population. We are in a stage. 
of greater stability of population
1 
The greater the stability of 
the population, the less rapid is the growth, hence the larger is 
the proportion which is in the working age group. So you have to 
consider not only the population, but also its age distribution and 
its composition. Our labor force today is somewhere around sixty­
two to sixty-five million people. 
The second element we have to think of is the degree of 
employment of that labor force. We hear all kinds of talk of 
"full employment". The term "full employment" is· really "high 
level employment". If we ever reached a point of full employment, 
our whole system would be completely. rigid with no mobility or 
flexibility. Full employment really implies: "With a sixty million 
labor force-somewhere around one to two million unemployed." 
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to shift from job to job as the production of certain things is 
stepped· up and other things are curtailed. 
In war time, at the peak of employment during World War 
II, we got down to a figure of a.bout eight hundred thousand un­
employed. At that stage our whole system was tight and rigid. 
The problem of staffing various munitions lines which were on the 
upswing, of transferring workers from the lines where production 
was to decline to those where we needed more workers was a ter­
ribly difficult job with that degree of unemployment. Ordinarily 
we need somewhat more than that to provide the flexibility re­
quired in a changing production pattern. 
The third element is the amount of time workers are em­
ployed. Here, I think, today the average work week, taking days 
off and things of that kind, is somewhere around 35 hours a week. 
I think the standard forty-hour week now has gone by the boards 
somewhat. With that length work week, again we have more 
flexibility for expansion, because the stepping-up of the work week 
is easier. If we are already working a 48 or 54 hour week, the 
possibility of flexibility to step it up is much more limited. In the 
last war we had an average increase in hours per worker of up to
25 to 35 per cent, because we had that flexibility. There is not 
that same flexibility in nations which are already working the much 
longer work week. 
In addition to those broad elements in the labor force. we 
have to think:'" of a special problem in wartime, because probably 
the most able and the most vigorous of the labor force is drained 
into the military service. Also in wartime, the need for particular 
kinds of skill is much greater. The shift is to hard goods pro­
duction and out of soft goods. The need for mechanical skills is 
much greater. But again, those same skills are needed in the 
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skills-to get them in the places where they are needed--,-is extreme­
ly difficult. The training problem in wartime-the training of the 
type of workers which are needed for the particular production line, 
is one of the most difficult of the mobilization problem. 
In addition we must consider a particular kind of labor group 
-the supervisory skills. In our mass production type industry, the
supervisors play a very important role. Again they are the same
type who make good non-coms and good officers. They are taken
rapidly, and the upgrading that goes on to get the required super­
visory personnel in production, raises very difficult problems. We
could go on to many other aspects of that, but I have to skim
lightly.
The second major factor is natural resources. And again 
I want to mention two specifically-agricultural land is the first. 
In a war period, the need for food is considerably greater for the 
same group of people eating than it is in peacetime. Believe it or 
not, the military consumption of food per capita is considerably 
greater than civilian consumption per capita. In wartime the shift 
in production is to hard goods production. With more vigorous 
work, the need of food per person is greater. Again, almost inevit­
ably, you have an inflationary pressure during the war. People 
have more money to spend. They want more food. For exam­
ple, back in 1939 there were about 47 per cent of the families in the 
United States whose annual income was one thousand dollars per 
year or less. During the war this average income almost doubled. 
I assure you there is considerable room for an expansion of diet 
when you start with a family earning a thousand dollars a year. 
Hence the need for agricultural land, because of the greater 
pressure on agricultural land during a war period, is very great, 
and the food problem in war is of very great importance.· 
Second, a general group of things you have heard much 
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last war, and still to a considerable extent today, is in terms of a 
group which we call strategic or critical materials. To my mind 
they are infinitely less important than another group. No nation 
can be a strong industrial· nation and a strong war power without 
what I think of as basic materials-steel, copper, aluminum, rubber, 
the chemical industry, oil (natural or synthetic), and power. These 
are the key materials-the key resources, as far as the war econ­
omy is concerned, and to my mind considerably more attention 
should be given to the readiness of these material industries in 
peace time as a possible preparation for war than to give almost 
exclusive concern to the strategic and critical list where stock­
piling is the temporary solution. 
The third major factor is productive equipment-industrial 
plant and machinery. In this country we have a larger volume of 
machinery and equipment per worker than in any other country 
in the world, an.d it accounts for our very great productivity per 
man. Our productivity is about twice that of the highest Euro­
pean country. During the war, in .comparison with Russia, we had 
about three to four times the productivity per man, and about five 
to six times the productivity per man as compared to Japan. That 
is largely accounted for by the machinery and equipment which each 
man has to use, and also by the skills with which the men are co­
ordinated and the production process is integrated. Production 
equipment of all kinds is a yery key element, but there is . one in 
particular that I want to emphasize. That is the machine tool in­
dustry, which makes the machines which produce the goods we 
want. We have the largest and most highly efficient machine 
tool industry in the world. If we are going to have the possibility of 
shifting production lines from one product to another, in which we 
have to retool, then if the machine tool industry is not up to snuff, 
our flexibility is greatly limited. We have heard the term "armed 
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·· and for that we need a machine tool industry. The shift, for ex-' ·
ample, from the B-17 to the B-29 would have been impossible with­
out an effective machine tool industry because the tooling had to be
completely different. Practically all tools, that is the big machine
tools, were scrapped from the B-17 lines when the B-29's came in.
Where rapid shifts are required to improved types of muni­
tions, they can be produced only if we have the tools. If we have 
an effective machine tool industry, such shifts can be made rap­
idly, as they were. To my mind, Russia's greatest weakness at the 
moment is its lack of a really first class machine tool industry. Dur­
ing the last war we provided the bulk of their machine tools. Today· 
they are doing everything possible to get machine tools from us. But 
the idea is to have the "know-how" to make the tools, to make the 
things we want, and that is a very critical element in our war po­
tential. 
Another element is the size of our preduction units. This 
question of the size of the largest units, creates all kinds of prob­
lems of control of industry, charges of monopoly, and things of that 
type. But in wartime, I can assure you, they are a boon, because 
the large production units have a facility for organizing big produc­
tion jobs and for integrating all of the steps in the production pro­
c�ss. Giving a contract to a large unit like General Motors means 
that you put on the shoulders of General Motors the problem of in­
tegrating a production job, in lining up the subcontractors, in lining 
up the materials, and getting all the'parts of it tied in together. If 
that had to be done almost entirely from a central point, the control 
job would be almost impossible; hence time after time, during the 
war, many thanks were given for the size of many of our production 
units. 
A fourth factor, and one of vital importance is managerial, 
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other produ�tion factors, in devising. means by which they can· be 
made more effective, and. in supervising and integrating the whole 
flow of the production process. We are again very fortunate in 
our type of economic system to have probably the best·. training 
ground possible for the development of ·managers. . Our skill at 
management· and oqr management "know-how" are the envy of 
the world. Without that "know-how" in management techniques, 
our whole system would be considerably less effective. And that 
consists, to a very great extent, in the ability to break a job up into 
its detailed component parts, .and to be. able to fit men and machines 
to a job iii the most effective fashion. Where you have the prob­
lem of many l;VOrkers being unskilled and not trained for a particu­
lar' job. in war time, the need for breaking each task up· into its sim­
plest elements is of even greater importance than in peace time. And 
the fact �hat our management techniques, our production tech a. 
niques of a mass production character, do break complicated jobs up 
into simple elements, meant that the problem of training :workers 
was considerably easier. 
. . 
. 
Finally, one additional point is research-scientific ability, 
scientific skills and technological research. "If you don't keep up, 
you are lost." At various- times you have heard that phrase. You 
have to either be ahead scientifically, o.r lose. New production tech­
niques, new weapons, new materials, new ways to substitute for 
things· that are scarce, all are a part of the technological scientific 
problem which I just want to mention as vital. 
Those in general are the fundamental factors, the basic f ac­
tors, which determine the maximum to which our economy. could go 
in reaching its top. How do we attain it? What are the measures 
to attain maximum: production in war time? The first thing I want 
to point out is that we cannot rely on the type of incentives and 
motives that exist in peace time. In peace time, our system is what 
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move into those lines . of production whic:ti offer the· possibility · of 
the greatest return. If a thing is scarce in relation to what people 
want, there is a tendency to bid its price up, to make that line more 
profitable. Additional firms come into the business or old firms 
expand. Perhaps the possibility opens of paying higher wages to 
. attract more workers ; hence the incentives for movement of re­
sources in a peace time system is the opportunity of greater wages, 
greater profits, and a greater return per capita. We cannot rely 
. on that in war time. The problem in war time is the shift from 
peace time pursuits to munitions production. True, the govern­
ment, in buying munitions may quote a. price which offers a better­
than�average profit and which enables the new munitions lines to 
off er ,higher wages to attract workers. To an extent, that type of 
natural or normal incentive �an be used, but it is limited for this 
reason. As �e pay more to workers and as equipment gets a great­
er return, they have · greater income. But at the. same time re­
_sources are shifted. from peace time prod�cts, hence the supply of 
those products is reduced. If incomes are higher, people can buy 
more. Tlie inevitable result is that the prices of peace time products 
will tend to rise, and we are back in the same place we started, be­
cause then those producers can raise wages to attract workers and 
resources are. attracted back again. Or, it becomes a kind of a 
"step" proposition with greater and greater inflation. We cannot 
rely solely on the profit motive in war time to get the shift of re­
sources needed. Secondly, there is a natural apathy to shift to 
munitions industries for a war period of indeterminate length from 
a line of work·that you are used to and to which you want to re­
turn after the war. No worker with an established home wants 
to uproot himself .and his family and move to the new areas of 
munitions production, which perhaps are on the coast or far away 
from his old home in new areas where housing is not adequate. It 
. takes a very major incentive to get those shifts. We have to rely 
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RESTRICTED 
duction. We have to establish central controls, and the controls 
have to be operated ·from a central point in order to force the 
necessary shifts. 
Now what controls are needed, and what is the objective of 
the use of such controls? The first stage of the process is the cen­
tral plan. In a war time picture, especially today, it is a problem 
of planning for the utilization of total resources. It is not sim­
ply a question of a military production plan. It is a control plan 
for the entire economy, It is a total-control program. The first 
stage of it, of course, is the formulation of military requirements 
-the traiislation of the strategic and operational plans into logis­
tic requirements, and these in turn into production requirements
for the various types of munitions and allied products required. But
in the formulation of the overall plan, I would like to stress very
strongly, that there is great need for integrated individual plans
developed cooperatively and simultaneously, involving three ele­
ments-namely, the strategic and logistic elements; second, the
economic elements, involving what resources are available and how
they can be mobilized or utilized; and third, the political elements.
The latter involves questions of what kind of an economy we are
going to have, the degree of belt-tightening possible and still retain
a healthy civilian economy, the possibility of war time and post-war
stability, and the effects of various actions on the ultimate trans.;
ition to the postwar semi-normalcy. The three types of decisions,
the three types of plans must be developed simultaneously, con­
currently and. cooperatively; The time wasted in World War II, in
separate planning and in a kind of a resistance towards working
together intimately between the political groups-represented
primarily by the President and Congress-the civilian production
groups�the War Production Board, the Office of War Mobiliza'­
tion, etc.-and the military services, cost us a great deal of time and
many- errors. Today, the organization, at least, for mobilization
RESTRICTED 45 
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planning, the National Security Resources Board and the National 
Security Council, provides for that mutual exc'hange. I want to em­
phasize very strongly that that is the only way in which the plan· 
can be developed most effectively. We must have a unity in the 
planning groups and an. intimate interchange of ideas as the basis 
on which the total plan is to be developed.· 
Even so, the first to be developed must be the military plan: 
That, in turn, has to be judged against the availability of resources 
of the particular kinds required, when and where, plus the general 
political appraisal as to how much and how fast the civilian econ­
omy is to 'be disrupted. Perhaps we discover that the military pro­
gram can be achieved as it stands. Perhaps modifications are nec­
essary, and then it is a process of steady give and take. The size 
of the program, military or otherwise, has to be large enough to. 
provide a real incentive to get the wheels going hard and fast At 
the same time, it can't be so large that we have to commit all of our 
resources in a rigid program at once with insufficient flexibility for 
later adjustment and change. Change in war time is inevitable. We 
have to have some flexibility to make those changes, yet the entire 
1;>rogram must be large enough to provide the drive to achieve maxi­
mum production. President Roosevelt, in his message in early 1942, 
called for the production in 1942 of sixty thousand planes, forty­
five thousand tanks, a huge number of ships and other munitions in 
balance. He· called for one hundred twenty-five thousand planes 
and seventy-five thousand tanks in 1943. These goods were so huge 
that everybody practically threw in the sponge until they saw he 
meant it, and then they got behind it That was the inceJ.!tive pro­
gram, the high goal, that was needed at that stage to really get ac­
tion and the economy mobilized. As far as numbers are concerned, 
neither goal was achieved. But if you want to add, for instance, 
the pounds of aircraft in the type of planes that were in existence 
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ceeded by the weight of aircraft actually produced. But in the in­
terval, there were so many changes, such as increased weight of 
planes and types of planes, ships and tanks, that as far as the num­
bers went, the goals were not reached. 
Once a program is established, the control system has to be 
geared and meshed into that. That requires a variety of things. 
One is a series of limitation orders. Generally the only way in 
which we can get shifts of resources is to prohibit the production 
of the things frpm which we want resources to move, so we say, 
"No more automobiles." When you can produce no more automobiles, 
the automobile manufacturers and workers will willingly produce 
munitions. 
The first set of controls, then, is limitation orders, either 
prohibiting the production of an end-item or §topping the use of 
a particular type of material in the end-item which often stops pro­
duction. 
Second, are established priorities which direct the flow of 
components, materials and equipment to particular products which 
are most in demand. If the supply of a material is greater than 
the demand for it in high priority stuff, the demands of the key 
items can be met . by simple priorities. As soon, however, as the 
total priority demands equal the 'total supply or exceed it, priorities 
will no longer do the job of material control. Then you have to in­
stitute an allocation system-a detailed precise system of alloca­
tions to direct the flow of particular amounts of a material, so 
many tons of steel or pounds of aluminum to each particular end use. 
When things get even tighter, at. times we have to use also pro­
duction scheduling to take into account in more detail the needs 
of each particular production line, so that no matter how urgently 
the end product is needed, we don't flow more to its production than 
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duction controls, but a variety of others have to be used to direct 
. the economy, such as monetary controls, fiscal controls, price con­
trols, rationing and man power controls, and these must be in­
tegrated in with the material and resources controls. 
Typically, it is easier to control the flow of materials and 
to establish programs in terms of a common denominator of ma­
terials than in terms of man power or in terms of. price and so on. 
These other controls, therefore, must be integrated into the pro­
duction control system rather than vice versa. That integration 
was never successful in World War II, and is one that is being 
studied very carefully now. 
Two other things should be mentioned briefly in the steps 
to achieve maximum output. One is, what is the information you 
have to have to run this set of controls, this central planning? In 
any business you have a detailed accounting system and a set of 
internal records. General statistics are to the economy what ac­
counting or bookkeeping data are to an individual business. But 
the problems of obtaining statistical data from the economy as a 
whole are infinitely greater and present some of the greatest dif­
ficulties in central planning. Peace time mobilization planning 
should keep alive the statistical and informational tools, in order 
that decisions can be made most easily when needed. 
Finally, the personnel in the central planning group must be 
considered. There is no ideal peace time training to provide per­
sonnel for the planning which is needed in war time. The problems 
are over-all in character. Most of our business executives think 
too narrowly in terms of their own business and its problems. Here 
the problem is the integration of steel with machine tools, with 
tanks, with ships, with allocations, with rationing, and so on. It
is a broad overall conception. We don't train men that way. They 
must, in addition, have great versatility and be able to shift rapid-
48 RESTRICTED 
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ly from one' problem to another. Third, they. have to be able to 
_work eff ectiv'ely under pressure, including the intense pressure 
of criticism. They have to be able to make those tough decisions. 
They have to have the guts to do it and to do it fast. They have 
to have the ability to appraise a situation realistically even 
though they realize that they can't get all the information that 
is needed to make the best decisions. Nevertheless they must 
make the 'decisions with what information they have, and make 
them_ fast. More production men and less salesmen are needed in 
the lower echelons. The tire problem, one of the meanest during 
the war, was run by a group of salesmen for a time. Everyone was 
dissatisfied., A top-flight production man was recruited and things 
cleared right up. One of the toughest problems therefore, is to 
get the right type of personnel to run the top planning effort. 
The last general point I want to discuss is, "How large 
a proportion· of this total production potential can be devoted to ·· 
war?" In part, that is a political decision, but one point we have . 
to keep clearly in our minds. If the munitions production is to be at 
its maximum, there must be a healthy civilian economy and war- · 
supporting economy. Without it the efficiency of munitions pro­
duction will decline., The difficulty is to determine what might be 
called the marginal degrees of essentiality of various. parts of the 
military, war-supporting and civilian programs and they vary with 
the stage of the war effort. If you take the position of "no 
sacrifice for sacrifice sake but only when needed," then in the 
earlier stages of a war production effort, the limiting factor is gen-­
erally machine tools. At that time all machine tools are diverted 
to munitions. Civilian production isn't hurt, but it can't grow 
easily. 
The second stage is generally critical materials-usually 
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stage, the production of civilian hard products is cut. That, 
again, does not hurt the standard of living too much. True, civil­
ians can't get a new automobile, refrigerator, or radio, but they 
can get enough food, clothing, etc. 
The real pinch comes when the limiting factor becomes man 
power. Then the shortage becomes general. At that stage the most 
difficult allocation problems are reached. That is the stage we 
had reached early in 1945, and things really looked tough for the 
central control agencies. Up to that point the allocation problem was 
not impossible. 
The difficulty arises because there are no guides which can 
be used to determine those degrees of essentiality. You have to 
play by ear to judge the problem. Our most effective instrument 
was .what we called the "squealometer". If in the process of an 
alllocation or program determination, we achieved a uniform 
pitch of ''.squeal" from all parties, we thought that the allocation had 
been successful. On the other hand, too often there was an at­
tempt to increase pure munitions production at the expense of 
the war-supporting activities, and we found that by starving the 
railroads of steel plate to make additional tank cars, freight 
cars, and box cars, we really ran into trouble in the latter part of 
the war. Then it had to be diverted out of munitions to such uses 
in order to keep munitions rolling into the seaports. 
At the peak of war production only about forty-five to 
forty-eight per cent of steel output was devoted to pure munitions 
production, but out of a total of about 65 million tons per year of 
finished steel products, probably only about 20 thousand tons went 
to pure civilian uses. The rest was of a war-supporting charac­
ter, going for additional oil production, for rails, for maintenance, 
repair, and operating supplies, for war related construction, for 
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,There is one additional point that I" want to make in this 
connection. The length of time that is allowed to "reach peak pro­
ductic�n is all-important in this type of decision. If there is time, 
. it is possible to devote some steel and other critical materials to the 
production of additional steel plants. However, it takes about 
2½ tons of steel to build the capacity for one additional ton per 
year .. · If there is time, it is possible to make the decision to build 
more steel capacity. If there is not time, we can't afford to· de'­
vote steel for the production of more steel or other types of ma..: 
terial. So, time is a critical factor. in those decisions. Only if yeu 
have time, is it possible to build more capacity to meet the peak 
demands at a later stage. 
I am not going to have time to go into the role of the 
peace time planning agencies, but I do want to make one or· two final 
points here. 
I have taiked about the resources to achieve the maximum 
potential. I want to emphasize one or two final ones, which seem of 
great importance to me. We talk largely about things that per­
haps we can put in balance sheets and use to compare one country 
with another, such as facilities, materials, and things like that, 
_all of which are very important. But, when the real, all-out pinch 
comes, the key factors become things which we cannot put into 
balance .sheets. Then it comes down to human factors and morale 
factors, which include the effectiveness of those who are guiding 
both the overall ·effort as well as the segments of that effort in 
industry itself; their skill at integrating and coordinating the 
production lines ; the brains and intelligence they have ; their skill 
in devising production techniques, new ways of saving materials 
and things of that kind; their skills to improvise, to substitute, 
to find new and better ways of doing things. In other words, it 
comes down in part to the effectiveness of management, both in 
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Second, and perhaps more important is the morale of the 
working force and the morale of the bosses of production jobs. 
Jf their heart is solidly behind the job they are dding, if they 
· are convinced that the job they are doing is as important or more
important than anything else, if they have confidence that what
they are producing is going to be used effectively by the military
services and not wasted, the effectiveness of their work will be
greatly enhanced. Their confidence in the use being made of the
products they are producing is vital to the morale and the effective­
ness of the production effort. The activities of the services relative
to worker morale in the form of incentive programs· are extremely
important, but there was an awful lot of muttering and grumbling
later in the war in many areas. If the people as a whole are
solidly behind the production effort and morale is high, then in our
type of system, we can really go to town. If morale isn't high,
we will lose some of the power and drive behind that effort. It
comes down to the degree of unity behind the job that they are do­
ing. If the people feel no immediate danger of attack and are not
afraid, if they . are seeing in the headlines that things are going
fine, and if they have money in their pockets-more money than
they ever had in · thejr lives before......;.they want to spend it and 
they don't want to work in an all-out fashion. That is the time 
morale counts in keeping the drive and the pressure behind the 
job. In the last analysis wheft the pinch is really on, it's the 
morale factor, it's the heart and the will of the people doing the 
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